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Often, it has been observed that telecommunication
infrastructure development and economic growth proceed together.
While this relationship has been studied in the context of developed
(OECD) countries, in this study, we investigate this simultaneous
relationship between telecommunications and the economic growth,
using data for developing countries. Using 3SLS, we estimate a system
of equations that endogenize economic growth and telecom penetration
(respectively production function and demand for telecom services),
along with supply of telecom investment and growth in telecom
penetration. We estimate this system of equations separately for main
telephone lines and cell phones. We find that while traditional economic
factors explain demand for main line phones, they do not explain
demand for cell phones. We also find significant impacts of cellular
services on national output, when we control for the effects of capital and
labour. The impact of telecom penetration on total output is, however,
significantly lower for developing countries than that reported for OECD
countries, dispelling the convergence hypothesis.5
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Telecommunications Infrastructure
and Economic Growth: Evidence
from Developing Countries
Introduction
The co-existence of stark poverty and islands of technology
innovation in many developing countries has received little attention in
the literature. This paradox provides the motivation for our research
regarding the relationship between technology and state of economic
development in developing countries.
Convergence between Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT), in particular the internet, and its related applications,
has enabled low-cost diffusion of information technology products and
services in developing economies. A number of researchers (Norton,
1992) have hypothesized that ICT infrastructure lowers both the fixed
costs of acquiring information and the variable costs of participating in
markets. They point out that as the ICT infrastructure improves,
transaction costs reduce, and output increases for firms in various
sectors of the economy (Roller & Waverman, 2001). Thus investment in
ICT infrastructure and derived services provide significant benefits to the
economy. In the recently concluded First World Summit on Information
Society, Professor Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman of
the World Economic Forum pointed out that ICT continues to be the best
hope for developing countries to accelerate their development process.
However, in terms of the Network Readiness Index (NRI) published by
the World Economic Forum (2003), developing countries
1 continue to be
far behind (see Table 1).
2 Wong (2002) finds that the disparity in the
intensity of ICT adoption among Asian countries is wider than disparities
in their GDP per capita, and that Asia’s share of global consumption of
ICT goods, while gradually increasing over time, was consistently lower
than its share in global production. This implies that the competence of
the developing economies to benefit from ICT developments is limited.8
Since the intensity of ICT adoption is itself significantly
dependent on the level of economic development and competitiveness of
nations (see Wong, 2002), it is important to study the relationship
between ICT and economic development, if developing countries have to
benefit from ICT developments and further their economic growth.
II. Motivation and Objectives
There are empirical investigations (refer to Roller & Waverman,
2001) that specifically look at how telecommunications infrastructure
affects economic growth in developed economies, taking into account
the two-way causation between them. However, these relationships have
not been studied in the context of developing economies. Although there
are islands of technology innovation in developing countries such as
Bangalore in India, the observation is that Asian countries such as India,
China, Thailand, and Philippines have had generally lower levels of ICT
adoption than can be predicted based on their current level of economic
development (Wong, 2002). This has effects on their economic
development, which has not been studied.
  The objective of this research is to  analyse the effect of
penetration of ICT on the economic development of developing
economies, taking into account the two-way causation that exists
between them. Economic growth parameters (GDP) are estimated as a
function of telecommunications infrastructure such as main line  tele-
density. Based on the research, the contribution of ICT towards
economic growth can be used as benchmark to gain insights for ICT
diffusion in developing countries.
The paper addresses these questions to understand the
dynamics of this causal connection i.e. is it telecommunication services
that accelerates economic growth or overall economic growth that
creates the demand for more telecommunication services for their growth
to occur? In the context of developing economies, what are the factors
that determine demand for and supply of telecom services. Finally, given9
the importance of telecom infrastructure in growth, what determines the
change in telecom penetration in these economies?
The following section summarizes the literature on the subject.
The section following the literature survey describes the methodology
adopted. Then we describe the sample, data and the sources. Following
description of the data, we report results from the estimations. The final
section  summarises the policy implications, then discusses data
limitations, and concludes.
III. Review of Literature
The literature on the subject investigates the feasibility of
telecommunication as one of the determinants of the economic
development, and attempts to entangle the reverse causality between
economic development and the demand for telecommunication services.
Most infrastructure investments can positively affect the economy in
three ways. First, it can reduce the cost of production. Second, it can
increase revenues. Third, it can increase employment through both direct
and indirect effects (Alleman et al.2002). Similar to other infrastructure
investments, investing in telecommunication will increase the demand for
the goods and services used in their production and increase total
national output.
The impact of telecommunications on growth was first found by
Andrew Hardy (Hardy, 1980) based on data from 45 countries, with the
largest effect of telecommunication investment on GDP found in the least
developed economies, and the smallest effect, in the most-developed
economies.
Telecommunication infrastructure is also a little different from
other infrastructure, as a determinant of economic growth because of the
existence of network externalities, a phenomenon that increases the
value of a service with increase in the number of users. Because of this,
the impact of telecom infrastructure on economic development is more
pronounced as compared to other traditional infrastructure. This10
phenomenon has been demonstrated by Kim  et.  al. (1997) in the
analysis of online service competition. There exists a negative network
externality resulting from congestion, which affects the subscription level
of telecom services at the particular moment. But it forces service
providers and regulators to accelerate the investment in telecom
infrastructure. Norton (1992) showed that convergence could occur if
developing countries could add to their stock of telephones rapidly, since
they reduce transaction costs.
Garbade and Silber (1978), find strong statistical support for the
hypothesis that the two innovations in communication technology – the
telegraph and Trans-Atlantic cable -- led to efficient market places world
wide through significant and rapid narrowing on inter-market price
differentials. The research by Bayes et. al. (1999) finds that half of all
telephone calls involved economic purposes such as discussing
employment opportunities, prices of the commodities, land transactions,
remittances and other business items. Bayes et. al. also noted that, the
average prices of agricultural commodities were higher in villages with
phones than in villages without phones. Leff (1984) argues that firms can
also have more physically dispersed activity with increased telecom
services (for instance, encourage telecommuting of their employees) and
enjoy economy of scale and scope.
3
De Long and Summers (1993) find, based on several
regressions and instrumental variable methods, strong connection
between investment and productivity growth in developing countries,
which imply that developing economies have to import and install
machinery and equipment, in order to grow. Using the Peterson Index,
Cronin et. al. (1993b) finds a statistically significant causal relationship
between productivity growth and portion attributable to
telecommunications.
Eggleston  et.  al. (2002) show how basic telecommunication
infrastructure can create a “digital provide” by making market efficient
through information dissemination to isolated and information-deprived
locals and improve the living standards of the world’s poor, which in turn
accelerates growth. As the authors themselves point out, their analysis is
based on references and examples, and that more careful analysis is
needed in the context of developing countries. Souter (1999) provides a
survey of the ways in which ICT can be employed for the social and
economic development of remote or rural communities.11
Overall, the literature estimates that one percent growth in
telecommunication services generates three percent growth in the
economy (Gupta, 2000).
But we know that increases in purchasing power (contributed by
increased telecom services) also increase demand for such services.
Chatterjee  et.  al. (1998) point out that income patterns decide the
disposable income levels i.e. purchasing power for telecommunication
services, and in turn the growth of services.
This reverse causality has also been investigated by Cronin et.
al. (Cronin et. al.1991, Cronin et. al.1993a). Cronin et. al. (1991) employ
the Granger, Sims and modified Sims tests to confirm the existence of
feedback process in which economic activity and growth stimulates
demands for telecommunication services. As the economy grows, more
telecommunications facilities are needed to conduct the increased
business transactions. Cronin et. al. (1993a) investigate this relationship
at the state and sub-state levels. This study confirms at both the state
and county levels, using data from the state of Pennsylvania, U.S., and
finds that telecommunication investment affects economic activity and
that economic activity can affect telecommunications investment.
Roller and Waverman (2001) were the first to use simultaneous
approach to incorporate both effects in the economic model in order to
validate the hypothesis of reverse causality. They use data for OECD
countries that are all high-income.
Contribution of the study
In this study, we examine the sparsely studied relationship
between telecom infrastructure and economic growth in developing
economies, as these countries can use ICT diffusion for spreading
growth more rapidly. In developing countries rural teledensity is very low.
One of the reasons is high cost of providing telecommunication services
in rural areas and low purchasing power of rural population. While in
developed countries, 90 percent of the households can afford monthly
expenditure of US dollar 30 on telecommunication services, only 5-6
percent of the households can afford in developing countries such as
India (Jhunjhunwala, 2000). One way to improve rural teledensity is to
reduce the cost of access loop for providing telecom services using12
technologies such as wireless local loop (Jain and Sridhar, 2003). It is
also imperative to improve the economic activity of the rural areas using
telecommunication related services so that the rural population has
enough disposable income to purchase telecom services (Souter, 1999).
For an understanding of relevant issues in rural telecom in India, see
Sridhar et. al. (2000).
Thus there are a number of issues that are relevant to be
considered only in the context of a developing country. This provides the
motivation for us to more comprehensively model the growth of
telecommunication services and investigate the strength of its causal
relationship with the level of economic growth, and examine how to use
ICT as a tool to enable growth in developing countries. In this study, we
also estimate the price and income elasticities of demand for telecom
services for low-income economies defined by the World Bank. We use
panel data from these 63 economies to model this relationship. We use
demographic and general economic data, for these economies for 1990-
2001 from World Development Indicators (WDI), and telecom indicators
for the same period for these economies from the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) Year book (ITU, 2003a).
Below we discuss our approach, methodology, model, and the
data.
IV. Approach and Methodology
We use systems method to do the various estimations. We
estimate demand for and supply of telecom infrastructure, and
endogenize telecom investment and the change in telecom infrastructure
penetration. We estimate these equations along with the macro economy
production function, using data over 1990-2001 period for 63 developing
countries. Further, we estimate the system of equations separately for
main telephone lines, cell phones and all telephone lines which includes
both main lines and cellular services. Note that Roller and Waverman
(2001) report estimation results for main telephone lines, and for OECD
countries.13
As  Jha and  Majumdar (1999) note, for developing countries,
where penetration rates of telephones are extremely low, catching up
with developed countries in terms of telecom infrastructure has meant
investment in wireless and mobile systems local loops, bypassing
investment in fixed lines. This is especially so because mobile networks
are a quick and inexpensive way for developing green field projects. Our
calculations show that in the developing economies, the compounded
annual growth rate (CAGR) of cell phones over the period 1996-2001
was 78 percent compared to a growth of mere 7 percent for main
telephone lines over 1990-2001 (Table 2). Reduced per line cost, quick
deployment and better available technology are reasons for such growth
of cellular services in developing countries (Jain and Sridhar, 2003, Jha
and Majumdar, 1999).
Given this growth in cellular service, we use demand for cellular
services in a different model specification, as part of the system of
equations, to analyse comparatively the contributions of main line and
cellular mobile penetration to economic growth.
Simple Pearson’s correlation coefficients between GDP per
capita and total, main and cell phone penetration are found to be
respectively 0.59, 0.58 and 0.24 (all statistically significant). Although
these  correlations are not as high as those found by Roller and
Waverman (2001), given their statistical significance, it is not surprising
that we subsequently find quite substantial effects of telecom penetration
on GDP.
We use 3SLS to estimate the system of equations.
4 We deploy
the structural model which endogenizes telecommunication investment,
similar to that in Roller & Waverman (2001). Further, we identify certain
variables that are of specific relevance in the context of developing
economies.
We have developed three models, the first one considering both
main telephone lines and cellular services, the second one only the main
telephone service and the third model considering only the cellular
mobile service. List of the variables used in the models and their
descriptions are given in Table 3.
Note that in each model we estimate a system of equations. In
the first equation (all models), we relate the national aggregate economic14
activity measured in GDP to Annual real Gross Fixed Capital Formation
net of Telecom investment (K), total  labour force (LF) and stock of
telecommunications infrastructure measured in tele-density (number of
telephones per 100 population).
The aggregate production function, relating total telecom service
(or main lines only (second model) or cellular penetration (third model)),
to national output, is as follows:
Log (GDPit) = a0i + a1 log (Kit ) + a2 log (LFit ) + a3 log
(TPEN/MTEL/CELL it ) + a4 t + e
1
it                            (1)
5
In (1), t is a linear time trend. We expect all the inputs – capital
(net of telecom), labour, telecom infrastructure to have a positive effect
on total national output.
6
Our next equation in the system of equations (all models) is
demand for telecom service. In most of the developing countries, initially,
the government was providing telecommunications service and there
was a huge waiting list for main telephones. Hence we define effective
demand for telecommunications infrastructure as the sum of existing
teledensity and waiting list for mainlines.
7
We model the demand for telecom as for a normal good or
service, as being dependent on income and price. This demand is a
function of real price of telecommunication services and real per capita
GDP. In contrast to Roller and Waverman (2001) who use telephone
service revenue per mainline, we use the monthly subscription charge as
measure of telephone price. These charges are normally referred to as
rentals, and we use the rental charges for main lines, cellular services
and the average of the two in the model for total telecom penetration. We
use rental as a measure of telephone price owing to the following
reasons:
•  Telephone service revenue per mainline may not be a suitable
measure of telephone price if revenue does not necessarily increase
or decrease with price. This itself depends on the price elasticity of
demand.
•  Monthly rentals are normally used to recover the capital cost of
providing telecom services. The user also pays for usage. Since we
are interested in penetration, it is only access to telecom15
infrastructure, not the usage of the infrastructure itself that is of
interest to us.
The demand equation, hence, can be written as follows (note that in
each specification, we replace demand for total telephone services,
mainlines and cellular services and their respective prices):
Log (TPENWL/MTELWL/CELLit) = b0i + b1 log (GDPCAPit )+ b2
log(TELP/MLPRCE/CELLPRCE it ) + e
2
it                             (2)
As in traditional microeconomics, we expect the price elasticity of
demand to be negative, and the income elasticity, to be positive.
To model the supply side of telecommunications, we determine
annual telecom investment (TTI) as a function of certain geographic,
economic, and regulatory variables. We  operationalize these factors
using geographic area of the country (GA), and telecommunication
service price, measured using the monthly subscription charges, and
regulatory structure of the telecom industry.
Note here a technical point. In the demand equation, for mainline
and cell phone specifications, we use the price of getting a main landline
and cellular service respectively, as the telecom price. In the supply
equation (all models), however, we use the average telephone (average
of main and cell phone) price, in all specifications, as determining the
supply of telecom infrastructure. This is because, while price of
landline/cellular service determines the demand for landline/cellular
service, the supply of telecom infrastructure is more complex. Telecom
infrastructure is composed of access networks (landlines and cellular
access) and backbone networks that interconnect access networks.
Completing a landline or a cellular call depends on the existence of
interconnection across these networks. This makes it wrong or
inadequate specification to make supply of telecom depend only on
mainline price or cell phone price in any specification. Also it is to be
noted that annual telecom investment reported in ITU (2003a) is not
available by landline/cellular services for the reasons mentioned above.
Hence we use average telephone price as the appropriate price variable
in the supply equation in all models. In general, price has a positive
effect on supply.16
Further, the supply of telecom investment depends on potential
demand measured by the waiting list for main telephone lines. Next, note
that given the service-price nexus in the sector (unlike road
infrastructure, for instance), investment opportunities are lucrative, and
the market structure plays an important role in determining the supply of
telecom investment. Most of the countries migrated from a government
monopoly operation to duopoly and eventually competition in basic and
cellular mobile services. The liberalisation in telecom industry brought in
both fresh￿domestic and foreign￿investment into the country. For
example, India witnessed an increase in telecom investment from $2.82
billion in 1998 to $3.98 billion in, an increase of over 40 percent (ICRA,
2002). We have indicated whether there is monopoly (1) or competition
(0) in either the basic or cellular service by a dummy variable
(MKTDUM). In general, competition encourages more investment. Noll
(2000) refers to certain aspects of market structure that  favour
competition over monopoly in telecom services. One is technological
progress that has stimulated heterogeneous demand among consumers
such as mobility (cell phones), speedy transmission of large data files
and high-speed digital transmission. These, as he points out,  favour
entry by specialised firms that cater to a specialised niche area. Second,
the inefficiency of incumbent monopolies.  That is, in countries where
service is poor and penetration low, entrant firms (service providers) can
take advantage of excess demand to build a network of superior
performance that is attractive to the customers. Finally,  Noll (2000)
points out a politically attractive feature of competition as well-increasing
foreign capital flows into the industry. We have included only the current
market structure due to non-availability of data for previous years in our
study. This is not a serious limitation as most of the countries started out
with duopoly in cellular service and continue to remain so. Most of the
developing economies as indicated before continue to have monopoly in
basic services. Since we use the price of telephone service in the supply
equation along with regulatory structure, it can be argued that there can
be correlation between price and market structure. Competitive markets
force prices to be lower compared to monopoly markets. However, in
most of the developing countries regulator fixes the price of basic
services to make it affordable, and hence the evolving competition does
not have an effect on price. Even in cellular service where price is market
driven, imposition of high license fees and interconnection charges
forces prices to settle down at cost plus levels and introduction of
additional players does not have notable effect on service prices (also
see Singh 2002). We have noted from the ITU  website (www.itu.int)17
information for all countries on whether/not interconnection charges and
license fees are regulated, and who the regulator is, but not the actual
charges.
Taking into account these considerations, the supply function is
estimated as given in equation (3).
Log (TTIit)= c0i+ c1log(GAit)+ c2WLit + c3log(TELPit)+c4MKTDUMit +e
3
it   (3)
Note that there is no variation in model specification for total,
main or cellular service for reasons mentioned above. We expect
geographic area to have positive effect, so that the larger the land area
of the country, larger will be the investments required, to maintain a
certain level of penetration. The waiting line for main lines is an indicator
of market demand, and so will have a positive impact.
Finally, equation (4) shown below, characterises the growth of
telecom penetration as a function of the telecommunications investment
and geographic area of the country. Note that here also, the specification
within the system is the same for total, mainlines and cellular service. We
expect that investment will have a positive impact, and geographic area,
negative impact on the penetration rate.
Log (CHGTEL/CHGMTEL/CHGCELL it)= d0i+ d1log(TTIit)+d2log(GAit)+ e
4
it        (4)
For all models, the list of instruments we used were: time trend t,
levels of capital stock (net of telecom investment) and that of  labour
force, geographic area, market structure dummy, and average telephone
price (average of subscription charges for main line and cell phones).
These variables are exogenous to all equations in the various models.
V. Description of Full Sample18
Tables 4-5 give descriptive details of relevant variables, for
observations used in the main line and cell phone estimations
respectively. The minimum and maximum values for the time trend show
that we have used 12 years for our study (1990-2001). Because of our
calculation of change (over the previous year) for various forms of
telephone penetration, for the estimations, we lose a year for all
countries. The observations for cell phones are lower than those for main
lines, as most of the countries started experiencing rapid cell phone
penetration only after 1995 (Table 5). The change in penetration for land
lines and cell phones are greater than 1 (Tables 4-5) suggesting
continual increase in land line penetration, and more so for cell phones.
Interestingly, the average and maximum waiting list for landlines in
countries with cell phone (the smaller sample, Table 5) are much smaller
than those in the full sample. This shows that countries with rapid cell
phone penetration did not have waiting lists to the same extent as those
without.
On average, the total telephone penetration in the developing
countries we have studied, is much lower (being 2.5 per 100 inhabitants)
than that observed in the OECD countries (30 per 100 inhabitants). In
our sample, the maximum total  tele-density is itself 20, observed for
Ukraine in 1999. The landline penetration is even less. On average the
GDP per capita for these countries is much lower than that observed for
the OECD group of countries.
The average telephone price and mainline price are quite small
in constant 1995 US dollar, when compared to that for cell phone
subscription. Here it may be relevant to note that in developing
economies, for basic mainlines, the tariffs are always kept low by the
regulator to make the service more affordable.
The mean for market structure dummy in the full sample shows
that 60 percent of countries continued to have monopoly in providing
telephone services.
VI. Results from Estimation19
Tables 6-7 show the estimation results for the three
specifications of system of equations. These tables show estimates of
the production, demand, supply, and finally of the change in telecom
penetration.
Estimation for all telephone lines (main lines and cell
phones)
Estimates of the production function for all telephone lines are as
expected. These estimates indicate that capital, labour force and total
telephone penetration positively impact aggregate output.
8 The
elasticities we obtain for capital, and labour are respectively 0.49 and
0.47. This indicates that 1 percentage increase in  labour and capital
inputs roughly increases aggregate national output by 0.5 percent each.
Roller and Waverman (2001) find output  elasticities of 0.41 and 0.69
each for capital and  labour. Our estimates show that a 1 percent
increase in tele-density (total telephones per 100 population) increases
national output by 0.14 percent, whereas Roller and Waverman (2001)
find output elasticity of 0.05 for main lines per capita, after allowing for
country-specific fixed effects. We find elasticity of 0.13 for main line tele-
density (Table 6). Thus it is possible that the impact of telecom
penetration on total output, is significantly lower for developing countries
than that observed for high-income countries, dispelling the convergence
hypothesis.
Estimates of the demand for telecom infrastructure, when we
take into account all telephone lines, show the dominance of traditional
economic factors – income and price. The income elasticity of demand
for telecom services is positive and greater than 1 (being 1.64),
indicating elastic demand. This implies that the reverse causation we
suspect exists between telecom and economic growth, indeed is true. So
any increases in GDP translate to increases in personal disposable
income, and hence increase demand for telecom services. The price
elasticity of demand is as expected, negative (-0.30), less than what
Roller and Waverman (2001) find with respect to OECD countries.
Estimates of the supply equation indicate that the market
potential (WLMLNS) is an important determinant of investment in
telecom, despite the small magnitude of its coefficient. The dummy for20
market structure is positive and significant. This shows that in developing
countries that are characterised by monopoly in the telecom industry,
more investment in telecom may be expected when compared with their
counterparts that have competition in these services. This is an anomaly,
as we expect that with open markets and competition, more investments
follow. One reason for the anomalous result could be that the telecom
investment data obtained by ITU is normally from the government
operators. For example, the annual telecom investment of INR 165
million in 2001 reported by ITU (2003a) refers to only investment by the
largest government operator, which contributed to 88 percent of the total
investment in the telecom sector for that year (ICRA, 2002). Thus, with
increased competition,  less may be invested by the government
operators, but private investment could have increased. This appears to
be more of a data issue than a problem with our finding.
The final equation estimates changes in telecom penetration as
dependent on investment and geographic area. As we expect, holding
other factors constant, telecom investment always increases penetration.
Specifically, a 10 percent increase in investment increases telecom
penetration by 2 percent. Similarly, holding others constant, larger
countries (those with larger geographic area) have lesser telecom
penetration compared to smaller countries, as we expect.
Estimation for main landlines
As discussed earlier, we estimate separate systems of equations
for main telephone lines and cell phones, to disaggregate their effects in
poor countries. When compared to the effect of total telecom penetration,
the elasticity of aggregate national output with respect to main telephone
lines is smaller (being 0.12, compared to an elasticity of 0.14 for all
telephone lines). The capital and  labour  elasticities of output remain
positive.
The demand equation for telecom shows that when it comes to
main landlines, the price elasticity of demand is larger than that for total
penetration. Given the fact that our price variable measures the monthly
fixed connection charge for installing landline telephone service, a 10
percent reduction in this price can be expected to lead to a 5 percent
increase in the demand for main telephone services in these developing
countries. This is because, during monopoly regimes, the erstwhile
government monopolies cross subsidised basic services in the form of21
lower rental and usage charges, from their other revenues. Even after
competition was introduced, basic service provided through landlines
have lower rental ceilings prescribed by the regulator to make it
affordable to much of the population. Even a small increase or decrease
in main line price will affect telecom penetration much. On the other
hand, cellular prices are market driven.
Estimates of the supply of telecom infrastructure are very similar
to what they were for all telephone lines. As in the supply equation for all
telephone lines, the potential demand (WLMLNS) has a positive and
significant influence on investment decisions, despite its small
magnitude. Similarly, like before, countries with monopoly have more
telecom infrastructure than those with competition. This, as before, we
suspect is a reflection of data problems rather than an inherently
opposite trend.
Finally, estimates of the change in telecom penetration equation
are as we expect. This shows that a 10 percent increase in investment
can lead to a 1 percent increase in telecom penetration for land lines,
lower than for all telephone lines.
Estimation for cell phones
  As we indicate, we estimate a separate system of equations for
cell phones (Table 7). First, note that developing countries with low
penetration rates for main telephone lines, find cell phones to be quite
inexpensive and less time-consuming to install. Second, demand for
mobile communication devices such as cell phones need not be always
driven by economic factors even in developing economies.
Note that the sample size here is much smaller (being based on
63 observations) because of the non-availability of cell phone related
data from a number of countries during our study period.
Estimates of the production function taking into account cell phones
show that when the contributions of capital and labour in total national
output are controlled for, cell phones are the only ones that contribute
significantly to national output. The elasticity shows that a  1 percent
increase in cell phone penetration can cause output to increase by 7
percent. So far, our review of the literature has shown output increases
of up to 3 percent as being normal with telephone penetration increases.22
Although our estimate of this effect may seem a little exaggerated, there
are some reasons to believe why we may expect this to be the case:
•  Cell phone penetration in the developing countries in our sample
started increasing rapidly during the second half of the 1990s due to
changes in telecom regulation (see Table 2), and move to
competitive market structures. Most of the developing countries leap-
frogged into second-generation mobile cellular systems, bypassing
deployment of main lines.
•  Cell phone penetration can lead to dramatic increases in output by
reducing transaction costs, including, but not limited to, decisions
relating to production of goods and services. For instance, value
added services such as stock quotes and commodity prices provided
by cellular service providers at affordable prices using the latest
digital cellular technologies, may be expected to produce tangible
economic outcomes.
Estimates of the demand for cell phone services show that
traditional economic factors that explain the demand for other services
(including main landlines) do not explain demand for cell phones. None
of the traditional price or income elasticities of demand for cell phone
services are significant at the conventionally accepted levels. This shows
that micro, household decisions relating to cell phone services are
dependent on non-economic factors. These could be related to
necessity, whether or not long commutes to job are involved, and nature
of job (for instance, on-site workers). Since we could not capture these
micro-level variables in our data set, we are unable to explain well the
changes that occur in the demand for cell phones. But we find that price
and income variables are not important in explaining demand for this
service.
Estimates of the supply equation for telecom investment when
we take into account only cell  phones, show that market potential
(WLMLNS) has a powerful positive influence on its supply. This effect is
the same as what we have found with respect to all telephone lines and
main telephone lines. Unlike the other equations, however, the land area
has a positive and significant influence on supply of telecom
infrastructure. This shows that having large geographic areas
necessitates increased investment in infrastructure to increase
penetration. Frequently it is this investment in infrastructure that
facilitates adoption of cell phone services as compared to landlines.23
Finally, estimates of the equation that explains changes in cell
phone penetration do not yield expected results. Telecom investment
has a negative effect on cellular penetration, contrary to expectation.
Note that in most of the developing countries cellular services are green
field projects, requiring a huge capital investment to commence. Initial
investment in interconnection facilities to connect to other networks does
not immediately translate into increase in subscriber base. It is possible
that there could be some time lag before green field projects translate to
increased penetration. There is a large and positive impact of land area
on change in cell phone penetration. This is unusual as larger areas
require more infrastructure for providing service and hence will have low
penetration rates. However, the geographic reach of wireless cellular
service is superior compared to wired landline services.
VI. Policy Implications of the Research
Our research shows, how, for the first time, in the context of
developing economies, we can expect telecom penetration to affect GDP
and how telecom investment can impact penetration. This has
implications for how developing economies can increase their
penetration with increases in telecom investment, and if they do, how
much they can expect their national output to grow.
We work through an example to show what our findings mean for
India. Our model (for total telecom penetration) predicts the total GDP for
India to have been US $454 billion (constant 1995 dollars). Note that
India’s actual GDP for 2001 was US $496 billion (again in constant 1995
dollars). The error in prediction is roughly –9 percent.
We note that India’s National Telecom Policy (NTP), 1999
envisages a tele-density of 7 (main lines + cell phones) by the year 2005,
and 15 by 2010. This, we assume, is the expected total telecom
penetration. At these envisaged levels of tele-density, India’s GDP, using
our model (for total telephone penetration), taking into account the 9
percent prediction error, in 2005 would be US $ 529 billion, 7 percent24
increase over its 2001 actual GDP. In 2010, with  tele-density of 15,
India’s GDP would be US $589 billion, 19 percent increase over its
actual 2001 GDP. Alternatively, if India were to have Ukraine’s  tele-
density (20, which is the highest in our sample), holding its capital and
labour resources constant, India’s GDP would be $614 billion, 24 percent
increase over its actual 2001 GDP.
How can India achieve this  tele-density? The Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI, 2001) noted that “…by the year
2010, the tele-density is targeted to reach 15 percent.  ….To achieve all
this, both the basic and the cellular mobile services will have to achieve a
high rate of growth involving a very substantial investment of the order of
about US $ 70 billion” (ICRA Report, 2002)).
To evaluate the implications of TRAI’s suggestion, we convert
their envisaged level of investment to average, annual constant US $
using India’s implicit price deflator.
9 This turns out to be US$72 billion (in
1995 constant dollars) over a period of 10 years, or US $7.2 billion per
year.
10 At India’s 2001 investment of US $3 billion (constant 1995
dollars), our model predicts India’s telecom penetration to have
increased by 1.11 times its penetration in 2000. However, in reality,
India’s actual penetration over 2000-01 increased by 1.23 times. Again,
factoring into account the 11 percent prediction error, we find that at the
levels of telecom investment envisaged by TRAI, India’s telecom
penetration can increase by 1.26 times every year. Given this growth,
our model predicts a  tele density of 14 by 2006 for India, at the
investment level envisaged by TRAI.
Our research also shows in developing countries wireless mobile
networks contribute significantly to national output. Hence policymakers
need to create a conducive competitive climate for the growth of this
industry segment. Traditional  compartmentalisation and separation of
licenses for landline and mobile services is blurring owing to convergent
technologies. For example, in India, Unified Access License that
integrates basic and cellular services has been initiated by the
government and the regulator (DoT, 2004). This allows basic services to
provide mobile services using appropriate technologies. The license fees
and spectrum charges for mobile services are still high in most of
developing countries (Singh, 2002). The interconnect charges are fixed
to favour the incumbent government firms which in turn increases the
price (Sridhar, 2003). Hence the regulator and the government should fix25
optimal license, spectrum, and interconnect charges which provides
enough revenue for the government without affecting the competitive
climate.
Being green field projects, setting up telecom infrastructure
requires huge investment, especially in developing countries. Domestic
market in developing economies cannot generate required funds due to
their smaller size. Countries such as India, set upper limit on Foreign
Direct Investment and cite security concerns for restricting the flow of
foreign investment in the telecom sector. Foreign investors also are
reluctant to invest when telecom policies are not transparent and stable
(Sridhar, 2000). Policymakers and regulators should promote a
conducive climate for foreign investment so that the huge capital
investment required for building telecom infrastructure can be met.
VII. Summary of Findings and Limitations
In this study, we investigate the simultaneous relationship
between telecommunications and the economic growth, using data for
developing countries. We estimate a system of equations that
endogenise economic growth and telecom penetration (respectively
production function and demand for telecom services), alongwith supply
of telecom investment and growth in telecom penetration. We find
significant effects of main landline and cell phone penetration on
economic growth, when we control for the effects of capital and labour,
but lower than that found for OECD countries, dispelling the convergence
hypothesis. We also find that while traditional economic factors explain
demand for main land phones, they do not explain demand for cell
phones.
When we use the model to predict the level of telecom
penetration for India, we find that India’s  teledensity will reach 14 by
2006. In fact, what has occurred in our post-sample period, in India
validates the model. The total number of mobile subscribers in the
country touched 24 million in November 2003.
11 Taking this and the main
landlines into account, teledensity in the country has reached 7 in 2003,26
and is expected to reach 15 percent by 2006 well ahead as specified in
NTP (ET, 2003).
Remember that there are data limitations that could limit the
value of the estimations. The cell phone sample is quite small since data
on cell phone related information are reliable and available only post
1996. For regulatory structure, we have used only the most current year
regulatory structure and assumed that it was valid for the entire study
period. Our assumption here is that anyway, since the regulatory
structure has evolved to what it is today, that is reflective of current and
future market structure in the industry. It would probably be a good idea
to use number of service providers instead of a dummy for denoting
market structure. However, this data is not available from ITU. Further,
license fees and interconnect agreements affect telecom penetration and
are important especially in the context of developing economies, as
Singh (2002), points out. Again, however, these detailed data are not
available for developing economies.
Government deficit, as used by Roller and Waverman (2001),
may have been a good indicator of governments’ ability to invest in
telecom given the ITU database, but reliable estimates of government
deficit were not available either from ITU or from WDI. Data on central
government debt, as a proportion of GDP, available from WDI, seemed
to be highly erratic across countries, time periods and sparse. So we
were unable to use a good measure of this indicator to determine the
supply of telecom investment. It is possible that we may have obtained
better estimates of the supply function if we had access to better data.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Everything said and done there is no doubt regarding the fact
that most of these developing economies have leap-frogged in cellular
telephony as a quick and inexpensive way of increasing telecom
penetration. Most of these economies have actually significantly
deregulated their telecom sector, and investment to increase telecom
penetration (especially using the wireless local loop route) does not27
seem to be the big issue any more. The big question that continues to
haunt many of these economies is, however, how increased telecom
penetration can be used to accelerate their economic growth and
alleviate poverty. This, it may be realized, is largely possible only with the
effective use of a very important resource, information, ICT has enabled
all to acquire. Telecom services may be used to obtain information
regarding prices, job opportunities, and markets. This is not a substitute
for actual economic growth, but a good enabler for economic growth to
trickle down, once it occurs.28
Table 1: Network Readiness Index Ranking (1=high; 102=low)
 of Developing Economies

























Source: World Economic Forum, 200329
Table 2: Annual Growth of GDP Per Capita, Main Telephone Lines and












Afghanistan NA -4.29 NA
Angola -2.29 -2.09 66.54
Armenia -2.95 -0.96 101.53
Azerbaijan -2.33 2.10 81.94
Burundi* -1.19 0.88 NA
Benin 1.54 9.49 83.99
Burkina Faso 2.06 8.70 100.00
Bangladesh 2.75 5.74 NA




Cote d’Ivoire -0.53 9.29 88.32
Cameroon -0.85 5.68 101.53
Republic of Congo -1.20 0.00 NA
Comoros -45.66 4.14 NA
Eritrea 3.67 7.71 NA
Ethiopia 0.95 4.28 NA
Georgia -6.78 4.84 130.89
Ghana 1.08 12.25 53.90
Guinea 1.17 4.97 62.26
Gambia 0.21 12.18 57.49
Guinea-Bissau -0.77 4.03 NA
Haiti -45.26 2.88 NA
Indonesia 2.48 15.85 49.45
India 3.34 16.66 66.10
Kenya -1.08 2.65 140.19
Kyrgyz Republic -3.93 0.72 NA
Cambodia 1.30 19.33 40.05
Lao PDR 3.52 16.30 37.89











Lesotho 1.53 2.95 87.89
Moldova -7.93 2.65 152.07
Madagascar 0.23 3.90 90.30
Mali 1.76 11.50 87.89
Myanmar NA 11.80 6.99
Mongolia -1.11 4.15 142.43
Mauritania 1.48 10.49 NA
Malawi 1.11 4.40 54.31
Niger -1.06 4.66 NA
Nigeria 0.80 3.63 87.17
Nicaragua -0.39 7.32 70.62
Nepal 2.62 12.76 NA
Pakistan 1.33 9.91 49.58
Rwanda -1.54 3.93 NA
Sudan 3.05 15.57 NA
Senegal 0.96 12.44 132.02
Solomon Islands -2.29 1.93 16.06
Sierra Leone -4.78 3.07 NA
Somalia NA 6.20 NA
Sao Tome Principe -44.01 5.50 NA
Chad 0.04 5.95 NA
Togo -1.14 11.23 NA
Tajikistan -8.22 -1.92 NA
Tanzania 0.61 3.84 86.69
Uganda 2.75 3.44 96.75
Ukraine -5.80 3.80 104.74
Uzbekistan -1.49 -0.25 35.72
Vietnam 5.07 31.55 60.53




Zambia -2.03 -0.69 83.62




Table 3: Variable Description
Variable Description
GDP* Real Gross Domestic Product in US$
GDPCAP* Real GDP per capita in US$
MTEL Number of main telephones per 100 inhabitants
CELL Number of cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants
TPEN Total Telecom Penetration computed as the sum of main
line (MTEL) and cellular (CELL) teledensity
WLMLNS Waiting list for main lines
MTELWL Sum of main line teledensity and waiting list for main
lines per 100 inhabitants
TPENWL Sum of total telecom penetration (TPEN) and waiting list




Growth of total telecom, mainline and cellular penetration
K Annual real Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) net
of Telecom Investment in US$
MLPRCE* Real Residential Telephone Monthly Subscription in US$
CELLPRCE* Real Cellular Monthly Subscription in US$
TELP* Average of monthly subscription charges for main line
(MLPRCE) and cellular service (CELLPRCE)in US$
TTI* Real Annual Telecommunications Investment in US$
LF Total Labour Force
MKTDUM Dummy variable for nature of market structure: 1 for
monopoly and 0 for competition
T Time period
GA Geographic Area
*Values of macro variables, GDP, GDPCAP, and TTI have been converted in to
1995 constant US$ using Implicit Price Deflator. Values of micro variables,
MLPRCE, CELLPRCE and TELP have been converted in to 1995 constant US$
using Consumer Price Index.
MKTDUM is derived from ITU (2003b). All the other variables are from ITU
(2003a).32
Table 4: . Description of Relevant Data for full sample (N=225)
Variable Mean (Std.dev) Minimum Maximum

































2.49 (4.40) 0.07 20.32
Total Landlines per
100 population
2.25 (4.22) 0.07 19.89
GDP per capita (in
US Constant $,
1995=100)
418.66 (217.17) 92.21 1076.21
Average telephone
price
0.10 (0.16) 0.002 1.97












0.60 (0.49) 0 133
Table 5: . Description of Relevant Data for Cell Phones (N=63)
Variable Mean (Std.dev) Minimum Maximum




























0.58 (0.94) 0.01 4.46
GDP per capita, in
constant US  $
(1995=100)
457.68 (221.26) 115.99 1069.56
Average telephone
price
0.10 (0.10) 0.001 0.52











0.65 (0.48) 0 134
Table 6: Estimation of System of Equations: All telephone lines   (Model
1) and Main Land lines (Model 2)  (N = 225)








Constant 4.80 (15.65) 4.72 (15.94)
Logarithm of Capital 0.49 (9.93) 0.52 (10.85)




Logarithm of Main land
line penetration
-- 0.13 (2.86)
Time trend 0.00 (0.89) -0.01 (-1.98)








Constant -10.23 (-13.33) -9.92 (-15.97)
Logarithm of GDP per
capita




Logarithm of Main land
line price
-- -0.50 (-8.95)






Constant 18.04 (12.00) 18.06 (12.44)





-0.17 (-1.42) -0.15 (-1.32)
Regulatory structure 1.07 (3.49) 0.99 (3.33)
Logarithm of average
telephone price













Constant -0.04 (-0.25) -0.07 (-0.71)
Logarithm of Telecom
investment
0.02 (2.54) 0.01 (2.44)
Logarithm of Geographic
area
-0.02 (-1.87) -0.01 (-1.27)35
Table 7: . Estimation of System of Equations: Cell Phones
(Model 3) (N=63)
Equations/Variables Estimate (t ratio)
Production function Dependent Variable: Logarithm of
GDP
Constant 16.16 (7.32)
Logarithm of Capital 0.51 (1.18)
Logarithm of Labour 0.57 (1.35)
Logarithm of Cell phone
penetration
6.75 (28.19)
Time trend -.21 (-1.46)
Demand Equation Dependent Variable: Logarithm of
total telephone and waiting lines
Constant -1.89 (-2.93)
Logarithm of GDP per
capita
0.04 (0.73)
Logarithm of cell phone
price
-0.01 (-0.85)
Supply Equation Dependent Variable: Logarithm of
total telecom investment
Constant 12.81 (8.70)
Waiting line for main lines 0.21·10
-5  (4.21)
Geographic area 0.35 (3.16)
Regulatory structure 0.20 (0.62)
Average telephone price 0.03 (0.14)
Change in Telecom
Penetration Equation
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of
change in cell phone penetration
over previous year
Constant 1.86 (1.21)
Telecom investment -0.19 (-1.62)
Geographic area 0.19 (2.14)36
                                                                                                        
End Notes
1 Low-income economies as defined by the World Bank (2002).
2 NRI is defined by as a nation’s degree of preparation to participate and benefit from ICT
developments (WEF, 2003).
3 Sridhar and Sridhar (2003) look at the impact of telecommunication infrastructure and the
telecommuting it enables, on spatial dispersion of population, using data from the United
States. They find that technology is a complement, not a substitute, for face-to-face
interaction.
4 The panel data procedure Time Series Cross Section (TSCS) estimates a form of panel
data model in which data are (typically) observed for a relatively large number of periods for
a relatively small number of cross sectional units, which is not our case. Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SURE) models are used for estimating systems of equations in
which the endogenous variables are related, and cross-equation error terms are correlated.
Since simultaneity is present in our case, we resort to an instrumental variables method like
3SLS.
5 The form of the production function is Cobb-Douglas, consistent with Roller and
Waverman (2001).
6 We use a macro production function approach that relates inputs to output. We are not
estimating the determinants of national output. This explains why we have not included
measures of government deficits or of trade openness that the literature shows affect
national output. Government deficits could well affect the supply of telecom investment, as
Roller and Waverman (2001) point out, but reliable data on government deficits are not
available for developing countries for us to include that in the supply equation.
7 For example, in India, even after private operators were allowed to provide competitive
service, waiting line for main telephones was around 1.649 million in 2001. Even after the
introduction of cellular services in 1995, the waiting list continued to grow from 2.277 million
to 2.894 million in 1996 and 2.706 million in 1997.
8 Remember here that we have estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function, and the fact
that the sum of coefficients is greater than 1 implies increasing returns to scale. This may
be, in fact, reasonable to expect, since the countries in the sample on average,
experienced Compounded Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) of 3% and 5% respectively in
their  labour force and capital stock (net of telecom).  Further, the average CAGR of
mainlines and cell phones were 7% and 78% respectively (Table 2), which may have all
collectively led to increasing returns to scale in the national output of countries in our
sample over the period of study.
9 This is obtained by taking the ratio of nominal to constant GDP for any given year with a
certain base.
10 Remember we do this because our measure of telecom investment is annual.
11 In fact, mobile phone connections are expected to overtake fixed phone subscribers in
India in the third quarter of 2004 as cellular penetration is expected to double from 2.7% (at
the end of 2003) to 5.2% by end-2004, according to a study by Gartner (The Economic
Times, January 24, 2004).References
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